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Skills training remains one of the most emphasised policy issues in the current 
South African economy. The purpose of this Policy Brief is to raise questions 
about our national skills development strategy in the light of the international 
literature on the subject. In the process certain new research questions arise 
for the attention of government, institutions like Setas, and private researchers 
in universities, institutes and independent consultancies.
 1. Introduction
Our official skills strategy does not possess an adequate research base; that is, 
reasonably well established results concerning strategic issues that are called 
upon to back decisions. Certain general comments support this conclusion: 
•	 First, the conceptualisation of the problems is partial. Education and skills 
training are not two conceptually separate spheres, but they are treated 
separately in policy formation because of their separate institutional 
histories. This makes no sense in resource allocation terms when looked 
at in a national perspective. They are competing resource uses for 
increasing productive competencies that we call human capital. So for 
the economic analysis of work competencies it is distorting to impose a 
hard and fast line between education and training.
•	 Second, too much policy discussion and action is conducted at an 
aggregated level. For example, training is measured and monitored 
by sector, by employee group, by broad occupation or accredited skill 
category, by size of employing organisation like a firm, and so on. 
•	 Third, there is a proliferation of skills shortage estimates by employers, 
Setas and various government departments which have flimsy credentials 
for accuracy. Employers when asked about their unsatisfied demand 
for skilled employees are not told the ruling price for the remuneration 
package they will have to pay. In addition, shortage estimates at one point 
in time are seldom if ever tested later as new information about skilled 
worker demand and supply becomes available. Also there is international 
evidence that factors like the identity of informants within a firm or other 
employing organisation influence the estimates of unsatisfied demand. 
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•	 Fourth, we cannot simply presume that training institutions and policy 
instruments are exportable between countries. National circumstances 
on both sides – like systems of education, employer and trade union 
organisations, accreditation procedures, and so on – mostly differ, and 
the consequences for policy borrowing are largely unknown without 
thorough investigation.
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 2. Forecasting Demand for Skilled Workers
The design of the National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS) makes 
provision for the forecasting of skills needs at three levels: the workplace, 
sector and national or economy-wide. To anyone with knowledge of the relevant 
literature this is surprising. Manpower planning, as the policy was known in 
the 1970s, went out of fashion because of its singular lack of success. A few 
reasons why are the following.
First, in practice a large number of variables have to remain static over 
meaningful forecast periods. These are required for the numerical estimates 
of skills needed – skills specified by accredited achievement, by occupation, 
and by sector – to be within an acceptable range of accuracy. In the literature 
this was judged not to be the case during subsequent decades. Technology 
evolved rapidly; shifts in patterns of international trade altered the mix of skills 
desired by domestic producers; and the changing tastes of consumers for new 
products kept pace with both these other two altering variables.
Since the 1970s the freeing up of international trade and capital flows between 
the majority of countries in the world is what is termed popularly as ‘globalization’. 
There is a strong argument to be mounted that these multiple processes have 
made skills forecasting ever more subject to error. So it remains a mystery 
why skills forecasting was a feature adopted in the late nineties during the new 
design of South Africa’s skills training strategy.
Second, there is no firm evidence on whether firms do make use of sector-wide 
skills plans put together by Setas when making decisions to invest in skills 
training for their workforces. This may be the case but the question remains 
unresearched.
Third, constructing a sector skills plan (SSP) requires considerable effort and 
resource input by Setas. Based on the workplace skills plans of its members 
(firms, state departments, non-profit employers and so on) these SSPs 
aggregate the workplace skills plans supplied to them, but in practice many 
use specialised consultants for the job.
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Fourth, a number of international studies have pointed out the distorting 
tendency to use figures of the most strongly growing kinds of jobs as indicative 
of job growth in national economies as a whole. This both exaggerates the 
changes in training requirements and tends to neglect replacement demand 
which is often considerably larger in absolute numbers than the filling of new 
kinds of skilled jobs.
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 3. Theoretical Issues in the Economics of Skills Training  
Any national system of labour-force training must confront and solve a range 
of problems. Who is to pay for the training; how is training to be organised and 
delivered; how is the content of training to be established; how is the skill level 
of a trained worker to be assessed and certified in a way acceptable to all the 
contracting parties; and how is success in skill acquisition best measured?
Mainstream economics postulates a competitive model of the market for skills 
as a baseline for analysing these questions. Given fulfillment of the conditions 
necessary for equilibrium – in which all parties like employers, skilled and 
unskilled workers satisfy their objectives – market processes will solve these 
problems. Broadly two types of skills are distinguished (originally by Becker 
in 1964). These are general or portable skills with multiple uses in different 
producing organisations engaged in the labour market, and employer-specific 
skills which have a use and value in one organisation or line of work only. 
By definition the latter skills have much more limited portability and therefore 
subject to weak if any demand competition. Employers pay the costs of specific 
skills training because they reap the benefits in production, being higher 
worker productivity and higher profits. In contrast, competitive demand exist 
for general skills which move freely between employers, in particular between 
firms who train and firms who acquire skilled workers by offering higher wage 
premiums in the market. Given such portability, it does not pay any employer 
to invest in such general skills, and instead the self-selected employees – 
workers with skill ambitions – have to pay for their own training.
This account of a competitive market plays a conceptual role in the 
understanding of human capital investment motives and actions. It functions 
as a discussion baseline in that it draws attention to the range of determinants 
likely in practice to influence the volume of investment in human capital. It 
would hold under a set of hypothetical conditions and is not a description of 
what happens in practice. In contrast, there is general acceptance of market 
failure in the production of skills. 
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 4. Market Failures in Skills Training
The competitive market model falls down as a literal guide to the process of 
skills training because of its presumptions about information and incentives. 
Deficiencies in these dimensions, as well as other recognised imperfections 
in every labour market, are accepted generally as the basis for intervention by 
the state or by trade unions or by employer organisations. These vary between 
national systems of training. Failure examples are the following:
•	 First, an appropriabilty problem can face training firms that have to recoup 
their investment outlay over the duration of the average worker’s period 
of employment. That is, such firms have to maintain a definite relationship 
between increased productivity and increased wage payments in order 
to stay solvent. They may not foresee this as possible. 
•	 Second, there is a link between incentives to train and restrictions on 
employment termination. Employers have to devise ways of retaining 
newly skilled workers for the period necessary to make the investment 
profitable. For instance, Japan has the institution of life-time employment, 
and Germany has powerful employer associations as well as “social plan” 
agreements with workers’ representatives and trade unions on quitting 
and severance procedures. These are seriously enforced. 
•	 Third, a pervasive imperfection in capital markets due to information 
asymmetries can inhibit the self-financing of skills investment by 
individual workers. Banks will not lend to unskilled workers who lack re-
payment guarantees or security (collateral in American terminology). In 
South Africa an interesting contrast is provided by the relative success of 
our national student loan fund to finance higher education. As yet there 
are no serious suggestions to provide the same source of funding for 
workers aspiring to obtain intermediate skills. 
•	 Fourth, information is inadequate (i) for employers in choosing the most 
promising trainees; (ii) for workers concerning training opportunities; (iii) 
in selecting training programmes which are prone to distortion by outside 
providers; (iv) as required by independent third parties charged with 
the evaluation and accreditation of acquired skills; (v) where on-the-job 
DPRU Policy Brief 08/P22
 8
training is superior to off-site institutional supply the monitoring task of 
public agencies outside the production and training arenas is particularly 
difficult; and (vi) because training firms know more about the post-
training productivity and personal characteristics of the skilled worker 
than do non-training firms they have a motive either to delay completion 
of training or accreditation or both in order to retain the worker.
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 5. The Public Good Dimension of Training
Where a commodity has certain characteristics which inhibit or obstruct its 
free exchange in a market, then it is deemed either a public good or a mixed 
good with public and private dimensions. The defining features of such goods 
are that they are non-rival, meaning that more for one consumer does not 
mean less for another. They are also non-exclusive in that no-one wanting to 
consume can be stopped from doing so if they do not pay or fail to meet other 
criteria in rationing access. Where and wherever these characteristics apply 
there is the potential for free-riding. Purchasers – consumers or producers if the 
commodity in demand is an input like skilled labour – are under no compulsion 
to pay the full resource cost for acquiring it. In consequence market allocation 
then fails.  
Insofar as training involves the transmission of conceptual skills, meaning 
abstract, problem-solving abilities, there is a case for treating it as at least 
partially public good in nature. Recouping the costs of producing such skills 
– an absolute requirement for all private goods – is notoriously difficult for 
public goods. 
The poaching of skilled workers by non-training firms, and therefore the inhibition 
or undersupply of that skill in the economy, lowers social welfare because it 
leads to suboptimal levels of investment in their acquisition. Overcoming this 
public good dimension of training by encouraging or regulating co-ordination 
between the contracting parties, is the challenge to all institutional innovations 
in occupational labour markets. Aiming to obtain a “high-skill” rather than “low-
skill” equilibrium along German or Japanese lines, or indeed to copy other 
national success stories that use training collectives by design like France and 
Australia, is what system reform efforts usually attempt to achieve.
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 6. Potential Problems in a South African Application
One impetus for the paper, on which this policy brief is based, is to 
concentrate policy attention on one of two major labour problems in our 
economy, a deficiency in basic skills, the other problem being the high level 
and persistence of unemployment. The origins of this deficiency lie both 
in our particular economic history and in recent developments in the wider 
international environment. On this view, the determinants of this lack of skills 
include our schooling system, the peculiar occupational market institutions 
of our apartheid past which divided the work force in ways antithetical to 
skill acquisition, and the economy’s structural evolution towards, first, the 
greater weight of manufacturing and then, second, towards the contribution 
of services in the make-up of GDP. Most recently, trade liberalisation, ignoring 
its other consequences, has raised the pace of technical changes imported 
from abroad, a process that at the same time raises demand pressure for 
intermediate as well as higher-level skills.  
All countries contain mixtures of market and state financing and of organisational 
responsibility along a wide spectrum of possibilities. A variety of classificatory 
schemes is suggested in the literature, but the important dimensions can be 
reduced to the following two:
•	 The signalling function essential in training is either performed 
predominantly by market processes, or it is supplemented by an 
information system aimed at matching resources to skill needs through 
sectoral or state agencies using planning projections of one or other kind. 
But an earlier section of this discussion brief argued for scepticism about 
the operational use of sectoral as well as national skills plans. 
•	 The financing mode is most often direct spending from the revenue flows 
of enterprises, government as employer, trainees and other private sector 
sponsors. Such investment actions are then constrained by horizontal 
market relationships subject to some degree of competition that varies. 
Or payment can be drawn from tax revenues or facilitated by public 
borrowing guarantees, and be subject to top-down interventions by one 
or more layers of governmental authority.
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But no single model from elsewhere is likely to suit South African conditions. 
Institutions can seldom be transferred on a one-to-one basis between 
countries. This is because they require complementary supports that also 
differ. To illustrate, employer organisations in the shape of strong formal and 
informal ties between firms at the industry level are a necessary condition 
for co-operative training. But they are by no means a sufficient condition. In 
the prominent German case, co-operative industrial relations and a financial 
system that fosters long-term company decision-making about human resource 
investment have proved to be integral elements in the success of the system. 
For years to come the overwhelming majority of our trainees acquiring market-
ready competencies will lack basic skills. This is because of deficiencies in 
their compulsory and further education, principally in mathematics, science and 
communication abilities. These foreclose many opportunities for employment.
In the international literature the applicable terminology concerns basic skills – 
by convention reading, writing and numeracy – that are lacking in labour force 
entrants who did not complete secondary education, or in high school graduates 
not qualified adequately to move on to vocational or tertiary education.
Concern about basic skills deficiencies applies also to a proportion of mature 
workers in a range of countries with often even lower levels of formal education, 
some in wage employment, some self-employed and some unemployed. 
However, the rates-of-return to training investment in older workers in industrial 
countries when calculated tend to be minimal or negative. This shows up in a 
stark conflict between efficiency and equity goals in national resource allocation 
to skills training, because investing in skills acquisition by older workers may 
simply not pay. But for us in South Africa, although probably true here too, the 
main lesson on a wider canvas is that it highlights the complexity of devising 
a system that has to serve our multiple constituencies both efficiently and 
equitably.
Two related observations need consideration. First, as already mentioned, at 
the economy-wide level of allocation decisions on human capital, the spending 
on basic skills training, spending to raise quality in formal education at every 
level, and spending to provide second chance or remedial programmes in 
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schools are all substitutes. Every such expenditure aims to achieve a similar 
end, to raise the work readiness, productivity and earning capacity of labour 
market entrants. Secondly, the choice between them must hinge on the relative 
rates of return in these different avenues of investment, insofar as these are 
even roughly calculable. 
A major deficiency of current skills discussion in South Africa is that these 
trade-offs tend not to be recognised. In part the problem may be the result 
of multiple institutions. Responsibilities in education and training are shared 
between at least three national government departments as well as between 
numerous agencies set up by government and reporting to one or more of 
these departments.
What is the most effective means of skills delivery? Is it likely to be off-the-job 
or on-the-job (OJT), in schools, FET institutions or in work-places? Tentative 
international evidence points to situated learning or on-the-job acquisition as 
best. Trainees tend to be more strongly motivated because retention in a job 
by the training employer at the higher skilled wage is more likely under OJT 
than hiring a worker with a skill obtained outside.
Recent research has shown that many students who leave school without 
basic reading and math skills can acquire these skills if the pedagogical 
approach combines basic skills training with technical skills training directly 
related to real jobs. This “situated learning” approach to basic skills instruction 
is particularly effective because it builds on knowledge that workers already 
have, and because it helps students to understand why learning the skills is 
useful to them. (Murnane & Levy 1994)  
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 7. Training as a Necessary but not Sufficient Condition for   
     Job Creation
Although lowered unemployment is the most prominent policy target in the 
labour field, and potentially an unambiguous benefit of any act of investment, 
training must be recognised as fulfilling only one of the pre-requisites for job 
creation. The other requirements for employment creation make up a difficult 
list. So claims for a significant employment gain from training expenditure on the 
implicit presumption it is by itself sufficient must be treated with scepticism.  
For a new job slot or unit increase in employment, what is required besides 
in most cases (i) training of some kind, are (ii) paying the costs normally 
incurred of screening applicants; (iii) a work station made available or created 
by investment; (iv) financing a period of low productivity during the worker’s 
initiation and integration into the firm or organisation; (v) a commitment to the 
worker on future employment and income security; (vi) ruling relative prices of 
inputs and outputs in the given technology at which an extra job created will 
be profitable; and (vii) an effective demand existing for the higher output from 
an additional worker. 
All these requirements must be satisfied simultaneously for a net job increase. 
Merely to provide such a list calls into question the too easy expectation that 
successful training alone will create jobs. This is presumed so irrespective 
of other conditions to be met or of public sector programmes designed and 
funded for that purpose. 
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 8. Conclusion  
The aim of this policy brief is to place selected issues from the international 
literature on skills training in a perspective amenable to South African 
application. To assist policy-makers and researchers, it summarises the ways 
of thinking adopted by policy-makers when faced with reform in other national 
educational and training systems. Certain of the key ideas emphasisied are 
the following:
First, training and education are commodities with characteristics that militate 
against simple allocation through a market. They are in part public goods. 
This means that, like knowledge, more training or education for one person 
does not necessarily mean less for another. So people who free ride on such 
investments, using them for economic purposes but not paying their full costs, 
cannot be excluded from their benefits. In addition, education and training have 
spill-over or external effects as well as being constrained by asymmetrical 
information which inhibits free and mutually beneficial contracting between 
producers and consumers. Price signals are thus not efficient, and nor is the 
volume of investment in human capital at a social maximum. 
The causes that contribute to these difficulties in market allocation are (i) the 
low frequency of purchase of skills training; (ii) the high penalties from making 
a mistaken choice; (iii) the limited ability to judge the quality of outcomes or 
know the direct links between inputs and outputs in human capital investment; 
and (iv) the substantial cost in changing the source of supply. For example, 
enrolment to acquire a skill can be in a training institute, FT college, university 
or technical university, as well as in on-the-job training in enterprises of diverse 
kinds. The literature on industrial countries shows the latter route for investing 
in skills, OJT, as by far the most important.   
Second, markets fail and governments fail, so the wisest policy is to identify 
actions and institutions which minimise the extent of either kind of failure. This 
is a truism yet nonetheless difficult to achieve. In general, the benefits from 
correcting a system distortion have always to be weighed against the costs of 
raising the resources required to do so. Piecemeal adaptation of this kind is 
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unavoidable. But the challenge is to create conditions for its rational application 
when investing in human capital.
Third, the case for the right amalgam of government and market in skill 
formation, or setting the economic borders of the state in this activity as it might 
be termed, has to rest on two pillars. These are an instrumental theory of how 
the mixed economy works, combining market forces with state intervention, 
and a set of fundamental principles based on value judgements. The first 
of these components warns that an economy is complex and may react 
perversely to actions which seem on the face of it to be welfare-increasing and 
therefore desirable. The second component, the underlying principles, make 
clear that there are inescapable trade-offs to be made. All good things do not 
go together, unfortunate as that may be in real world economies, so difficult 
choices have to be made. 
Too many protagonists in policy debates presume that only instrumental 
considerations need play a role in deciding what policy actions are best to 
pursue. On the contrary, we are firmly in the business of comparing imperfect 
institutions and policies, so we cannot avoid sacrificing one goal for another. 
That means resort to underlying principles that are inherently normative, like 
efficiency versus employment creation. 
Passionate advocacy of either an omniscient state or of private decision-taking 
via the market mechanism in every sphere of social and economic activity on 
presumptive grounds is what we do not need. Applied to training as well as 
educational reform, this point has been implicit throughout this discussion of 
human capital investment. 
Finally, the complexity of the issues regarding the role of skills training and 
education in the development process has been stressed throughout this 
paper. That explains the deliberately qualified tone of much of the discussion 
in this brief.
